the complexity of emergency response

The complexity of emergency response

After the introductory workshop by James Kennedy, a number of things have become clear.
First of all I have to recognise the need for case studies in the field of refugee settlement. It has become evident that no two cases could ever be the same. Emergency response often neglects this fact and therefore becomes inadequate. More knowledge and the development of more diverse strategies could help solve this problem.
Secondly I would like to acknowledge how much the principles of 'ordinary' urban planning apply when it comes to emergency urbanism. In fact the line between the two is very sketchy. Early decisions can have a long lasting effect, resulting in long term urban space. Therefore it is necessary to be conscious about these early decisions and develop a point of view from a social-political stance towards basic urban issues. Possibly this will have a key-effect on the decision making process.
Third of all I see complexity. Due to a list of factors, the whole process of field study, strategy development and implementation is an entanglement of a seemingly uncontrollable process. I think this is the reason why James and 'six or seven other potato shaped Englishmen' were always asked to solve the design problems for emergency response. The problems are so complex that you really need to know your way around and have good deal of experience. For someone less familiar with the problematic, the complexity could be overwhelming. This results in an effect of being either in or out, leading a hierarchical structure, measured by years of experience. I expect there is a chance we will be treated as greenhorns. This believe is backed by an earlier experience I had in 2005.
In the summer months I travelled around South-East Asia and experienced some of the Tsunami hit area's. I found a particular special atmosphere on Koh Phi-Phi in the Krabi district of Thailand. It seemed that everyone there was in the process of reconstruction and this gave of an exceptional positive feel. I wanted to be part of it and signed up as a volunteer. I thought I could help with a hammer, but I never got the chance. Cleaning beaches was all there was to do for newcomers.

In my view the complexity I spoke of earlier is created by six elements.

1. To start with the organisation of emergency response is rather complex. We have seen that in some cases the number of NGO's add up to roughly 200 and that there has been a need to restructure the organisations through the UN under so called co-ordinators. This is on the side of the NGO's, but every country has a different way of dealing with emergencies as well, and the co-operation with national governments is not necessary the same as with local governments. I expect the result being a whole lot of politics.

2. Then there is the availability of information. Obviously the complexity of organisation makes it difficult to find or supply the right kind of information. Possibly, some governments will not be keen to hand over some information and a some will simply not be available because of the lack of administration. Accuracy might be a problem as well. This is were we might come in to place.

3. Another problem is speed. Urban planning normally happens over a number of years, but with emergencies immediate response is required. The speed in which information is available and the time needed to make plans and strategies may not coincide with the need to act. Therefore it might be interesting to predict and pre-study potential emergency area's so that response can be direct and effective. Again this could be interesting for us and I can imagine this could be the case for Teheran.

4. Besides that it is money that dictates what is possible. We have seen the extreme differences in funds for the tsunami on one hand and for instance Darfur on the other. This limits ambition and makes the possible incision even more crucial. Strategic choices have to be made and consequences should be clear from the start. To add to the problem, funding does not take long term development into account. There is a gap.

5. And then terminology is another problem. When is an emergency finished? Is a shelter temporary and different from a home, or is it the same? When does a camp become a city? A need for a more diverse vocabulary might prove necessary and could possibly develop along with the research.

6. Finally we can recognise a problem with continuity. What happens when a certain person or NGO returns home? I can imagine that more than once a lot of experience and information is lost. How long is an average career in a NGO? Will not a lot of people find a more steady home based job after a couple of years working in high demanding environments? I think this has a serious effect on the number of experienced professionals available.

To conclude, I believe this discourse indicates where some chances lie. I think the main topics will be the handling of information and to find a suitable way to deal with speed. 'What if' scenario's might be the key.